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Susanne Woods 
Is Freedom Slavery? 
My mother, born in the South, was fond of the expression "free, white and 
twenty-one." She said it with flair and conviction whenever she wanted to do 
something mildly adventurous, and for her it signified a blameless privilege. 
Martin Luther King and the 1960s taught me to hear it differently, with a kind 
of embarrassed horror at family complicity in America's terrible racist history. 
Later I learned to add a more personal caveat: no woman, black or white, was 
as free as my mother liked to pretend. But whether it was the experience of 
the civil rights movement of the 60s or the women's movement of the 70s, I 
have always been fascinated with the idea of freedom. 
Freedom is the American religion. Like most religions it has its sects and 
schisms, its points of contact with different belief systems, its devoted adher 
ents and lip service hypocrites. It also has its sacred texts, from the Magna 
Carta to Milton's Areopagitica to the Declaration of Independence. One of the 
more recent sacred texts is George Orwell's 1984, published fifty years ago 
this year. 
1984's middle-class author was an unlikely prophet of international liberty. 
Born Eric Blair in India, destined for British Imperial service, he attended 
Eton on a scholarship and spent time as a guardian of the empire in Burma. 
He took his patriotic pseudonym from the patron saint of England and a river 
near the ancient city of Colchester. Yet he deplored England's xenophobia, 
fought in the Spanish Civil War, argued for a peaceful release of India from 
British rule, and advocated a less isolated, more European England. His inter 
nationalism barely extended to America, whose soldiers he saw as an occupy 
ing army, barbaric and largely repellent though necessary during the latter 
days of World War II (see his wartime columns for the London Tribune, such 
as the one for 17 December 1943). In 1984 London is the "chief city" of 
"Airstrip One," a principal part of the North American-European union Orwell 
calls Oceania, but its pitiful and dimly hedonistic proletarian economy is ne 
gotiated with dollars. Whatever Orwell's attitude toward American soldiers, 
he admired our founding rhetoric and in turn 1984 remains a staple of our 
high schools and colleges, a cautionary nightmare that transcends the circum 
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stances of its birth as a reaction against both Nazi fascism and Stalinist com 
munism. Orwell's totalitarian state, dedicated to power for its own sake, 
systematically destroys history and logic. "Doublethink" replaces them, a will 
ingness to contort reality and promote the great "Ingsoc" paradoxes that 
appear in "elegant lettering" across the soaring facade of the Ministry of 
Truth: "War is Peace," "Ignorance is Strength," and, the most mystifying, 
"Freedom is Slavery" (7). 
Orwell's protagonist, Winston Smith, reads the explanation for the first 
two of these party slogans in chapters one and three of "Emmanuel Goldstein's" 
supposedly subversive book, The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism. 
We get no direct explanation for "Freedom is Slavery," probably because 
freedom is the central desire and danger that propels Winston to his pathetic 
conclusion. Slavery is the implicit condition of the middle class, the outer 
party members whose lives are wholly owned by the inner party oligarchs; it 
is also, on a lower level of party oversight, the condition of the large working 
class, the "proles," whose work the party owns and whose culture the party 
defines and directs. 
If the third slogan were reversed, "Slavery is Freedom," its import would 
be clear enough from the course of the novel. Julia, Winston's competent and 
experienced lover, knows exactly how to keep the thought police at bay. She 
participates with feigned eagerness in the activities of the Junior Anti-Sex 
League, appears to break none of the major unwritten codes (there are no 
written ones), and is left largely alone to pursue her sexual adventures. Her 
apparent acquiescence "paid, she said; it was camouflage. If you kept the 
small rules you could break the big ones" (107). But which are small, and 
which are big? As Winston discovers to his dismay, her mind willingly accepts 
the erasure of history, to him a very big issue. To Julia it doesn't matter who 
Oceania is supposed to be fighting. She may "dimly recall that at one time 
Eastasia and not Eurasia had been the enemy, but the issue still struck her as 
unimportant. 'Who cares,' she said impatiently, 'It's always one bloody war 
after another, and one knows the news is all lies anyway'" (128). When 
Winston accuses her of being "only a rebel from the waist downwards," her 
response is to find this "brilliantly witty" and to fling "her arms around him in 
delight" (129). 
If slavery, or at least the appearance of slavery, is freedom, Julia's mistake 
is to pursue Winston Smith, who cares about the past and who entices her to 
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join him in the dangerous romantic adventure of old-fashioned, passionate 
pairing. But the phrase in 1984 is "Freedom is Slavery," a difficulty worth 
exploring. Orwell crafted a dystopian vision whose language continues to 
resonate across the Atlantic in a land where legal slavery is a more recent 
memory and lurking presence, like land mines buried at various depths across 
the scarred cultural landscape. The tenets and hypocrisies of America's reli 
gion of freedom, fifty years after Orwell challenged its great English tradition, 
make the semantic difficulties of 1984 a good occasion for meditation. 
"Freedom" in Western culture has from ancient times served to define the 
position of the citizen as distinct from the slave. The English term, like the 
Greek eleutheria and the Latin libertas, quickly acquired meanings and connota 
tions that signaled behavior available or appropriate to the free person as 
opposed to the slave. So Chaucer's Franklin asks, at the end of his Canterbury 
tale, which of his characters was "moost free": the noble husband Arveragus 
who permitted his wife, Dorigen, to keep an adulterous assignation rather 
than go back on her word, the squire and suitor Aurelius, who released Dorigen 
from that obligation, or the poor scholarly clerk who released Aurelius from 
the debt he incurred for the clerk's magic which in turn obligated Dorigen to 
Aurelius. Traditionally the one most free would be Arveragus, who possesses 
the highest social position and therefore the most power and greatest range of 
choices. But the poor scholarly clerk who can ill afford to forgive a debt is 
arguably more free than either Arveragus or Aurelius. Generosity and lack of 
self interest are the marks of true nobility and true freedom. (Dorigen's free 
dom is not even an issue; her only honorable options are to submit to her 
husband's will or commit suicide.) 
In its broadest sense, "freedom" as it applied to individuals has historically 
meant the citizen's freedom of movement and ability to make knowledgeable 
decisions, as opposed to the slave's servility and confinement to his master's 
land. From early in English-speaking culture freedom appears as both a proud 
cultural self-definition and a stubborn blindness. Feudal villeinage, or serf 
dom, disappeared in practice long before a court case during the reign of 
James I declared the last villein free, a man named Pigge. English common 
law, with its supposed protection from tyrannous authority, was a cultural 
pride at least two centuries before American colonists challenged its currency 
in the 1700s. But cultural pride was also cultural self-delusion. Women were 
not free, a sad fact acknowledged as early as 1621 in The Laws Resolution of 
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Women's Rights. Poor people were considerably less free than rich people, as 
the amazing generosity Chaucer gave his clerk in the fourteenth century indi 
rectly attested and the property test for suffrage until well into the nineteenth 
century directly confirmed. Slaves, by definition, were neither free nor were 
they English, though slavery never had the cultural and economic hold on 
England that it developed in America. Yet if freedom in Tudor, Stuart and 
Hanoverian England did not extend equally to all residents, the English be 
lieved in their particularity as a free people. By Milton's time, theories of free 
will from St. Augustine through Erasmus registered freedom as knowledge 
able choice, which the English assumed they possessed. 
Milton's Areopagitica (1644) was among the first English works to argue 
openly for the free circulation of ideas even though not all choice would be 
knowledgeable. Milton consistently hedged his idea of freedom, distinguish 
ing true "liberty" from a less restrained "license." Nonetheless, his attack on 
prior censorship is generally taken to be an early beacon toward a modern 
free press?though, as Orwell was fond of noting, control of the media by a 
few wealthy people makes reliance on a free press part of the English self 
delusion ("it is a fact that the much-boasted freedom of the British press is 
theoretical rather than actual," The English People). In Areopagitica, Milton saw 
no problem in burning wicked books once they were published and exposed. 
As it happened, he himself was to serve as a censor in Cromwell's govern 
ment. The effect of Milton's essay, however, was eventually to provide rhe 
torical fuel for the movement to extend free speech past the confines of 
parliament and into the rights of ordinary citizens, a movement that reached 
incendiary levels during the French and American revolutions. 
By the mid-nineteenth century the English legacy of freedom had come to 
mean the right of all citizens to move freely and speak freely, without being 
tied to the land or arbitrarily arrested, and all men of a certain age to be 
voting citizens, with minimal regard to their wealth. The American Bill of 
Rights codified many of the written and unwritten features of English com 
mon law, transferring to this side of the Atlantic much of freedom's power 
along with much of its self-congratulatory delusion. In the pretentious bom 
bast and commercial piety of July Fourth celebrations we forget that the 
tragedy and shame of America's legacy of freedom was and remains its reluc 
tance to let go of slavery. In many of these United States the wealth that 
allowed freedom in the pre-Chaucerian sense was built on the backs and 
brains of African slaves. 
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Real slavery?the ownership of human beings as if they were cattle?was 
not very long ago in American history. Those of us over fifty have grown up 
while the last African Americans born into slavery slowly died off, often with 
stories still to tell before the final dark. We have watched Civil War veterans 
fall from twelve to none, and now the youngest Confederate brides are the 
oldest widows, one or two remaining to tell us that their aged husbands did 
not like to talk about the war. Above all, the attitudes and assumptions that 
fed and followed slavery are alive and viciously propagating, in newspaper 
stories focusing on a black underclass as the "real" African Americans, on 
websites devoted to the chalk-headed nonsense of white supremacy, and, 
alas, even in anonymous graffiti written on the walls of college dormitories. 
Slavery was and remains a potent signifier of American freedom. As Or 
lando Patterson has argued, "we the politically free body of men, always, it 
would seem, tragically require the them who do not belong . . . who demar 
cate what we are, the domestic enemy who defines whom we love" (Freedom, 
405; emphasis Patterson's). With the emancipation and then suffrage of male 
former slaves, otherness that defined community bifurcated into resentment 
of African-American freedom on the one hand and resistance to female eman 
cipation on the other. Recently these definitions of the other have been joined 
by a visible active hatred of gender difference and variant sexualities. Black 
men and homosexuals are subject to beatings and murder, women of all 
colors and sexual orientation are subject to rape. This has not changed since 
slavery was abolished, though the laws are in place to deny it and every once 
in awhile some particularly ugly murder or rape will generate a flurry of 
outrage. 
In 1903 one of this century's greatest intellectuals, W.E.B. DuBois, argued 
that the way to put slavery into America's past and make freedom general was 
to assure all Americans three things: the right to vote, "civic equality," and 
"the education of youth according to ability" (Souls of Black Folk, 38). Born 
free in Massachusetts but a scholar of slavery and astute observer of its after 
math in the South, he speaks the language of freedom with eloquent passion: 
"The power of the ballot we need in sheer self-defense?else what shall save 
us from a second slavery? Freedom, too, the long-sought, we still seek?the 
freedom of life and limb, the freedom to work and think, the freedom to love 
and aspire. Work, culture, liberty?all these we need, not singly but together, 
not successively but together. ..." (8). Not until 1964 was the right of Black 
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people to vote legally assured in the South, over sixty years after DuBois's 
plea and almost a hundred years after the fifteenth amendment to the consti 
tution. But DuBois had died the year before, in 1963, a citizen of Ghana, 
effectively harassed out of the country he loved by the McCarthy era purges. 
Big Brother would have been proud. 
Perhaps the fate of DuBois offers one explanation for what Orwell's tyran 
nical state means by "Freedom is Slavery." Free, Black, and twenty-one, 
DuBois bought into the tradition of freedom as it descended from Chaucer 
and Milton and Jefferson and Lincoln. But for him to speak of freedom and 
culture, and to seek to exercise equally the freedoms of the ballot box and of 
speech and print that the American constitution seemed to promise, made him 
visible. The more visible he became, the more he became a target for those 
who had too long defined their own freedom in terms of others' slavery. Like 
Winston Smith, he became a danger, a bad example, too free. His every word 
was monitored, scrutinized, and eventually shackled. His freedom became his 
slavery. 
Smith's search for freedom and concommitant descent into further slavery 
begins with a sheet of paper. He is fatally attracted to an object from the past, 
a blank diary with inviting cream-colored pages, and with it he begins to 
formulate the past, express the present, and address the future. Time drives 
him. As he feels his body decay, his memory grabs onto history both personal 
and communal. When Julia's ahistorical love of sex energizes Smith's sense of 
the immediate, the book posits a Keatsian tension between present passion 
and permanent memory, between life and art. With every transgressive move 
toward exercising freedom?the purchase of a diary, a meeting in the coun 
try, the renting of a secret room, the approach to O'Brien?Winston becomes 
more 
acutely aware of his mortality and more urgent in his need to reclaim 
personal and collective memory. The more freely he acts, the more slavishly 
he pursues freedom, even in the face of death. 
This perhaps explains the curious asymmetry of the three mottoes in the 
world of 1984. Ignorance and war, historically negative, evolve into strength 
and peace. Since ignorance requires less crimestop ("the faculty of stopping 
short, as if by instinct, at the threshold of any dangerous thought") than 
knowledge, its "protective stupidity" is strength both to the orthodox person 
who pursues it and the power structure it is meant to enforce (174-75). Since 
war 
against an external enemy unites the internal populace and stabilizes the 
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interactions of the three global powers, it achieves a Hobbesian stasis some 
thing like peace. 
Freedom's history of positive connotations offers a different problem and 
the heart of Orwell's story. The goodthinker, or naturally orthodox person, 
shuns freedom, accepting instinctively and emotionally every word and world 
the Party constructs. Like religious fundamentalists who believe the Bible was 
written in English and literally true according to a current group definition of 
literal and truth, goodthinkers treat each new pronouncement of the Party's 
constantly changing story as timeless gospel. Predestination within a vast and 
powerful empire is enough. Free will, free movement, knowledge, reason, 
choice (Milton: "reason is but choosing"), all the elements of freedom, are 
addictive and dangerous. 
Winston Smith's slavery to freedom leads inevitably to Room 101 in the 
Ministry of Love, as Winston and O'Brien both know it will. It is not enough 
for Winston to will obedience, to learn through O'Brien's torturous nurture 
that he does not have the freedom to say two plus two equals four if the party 
says it is five. He must be exposed to what he fears beyond death, breaking 
the last hold of his own emotional freedom, his love for Julia, and turning him 
into a condemned, sentimental drunk who, at last, loves Big Brother (206, 
230-45). 
Applying Ingsoc doublethink to Isaiah Berlin's "Two Kinds of Freedom," 
Winston is finally free from his slavery to freedom, and free to love Big Brother. 
Perhaps most terrifying about 1984 is its illustration, however exaggerated, of 
the ways in which our desperation to escape our fears and find affirmation in 
group identity is at war with the traditional definition of freedom as knowl 
edgeable choice. Reason requires information, information requires a free 
press, a free press requires an indulgent power structure and a common belief 
in ascertainable fact. Winston yearns for a stable history, a foundation of fact, 
and risks everything to record one true life. Orwell, who when he wrote the 
book was already sick with the lung cancer that would kill him two years 
later, confessed that his vision might have been less bleak had he felt better. It 
seems to me that its very bleakness redeems the book from its didactic prose 
and occasional brush with sentimental nostalgia. Aldous Huxley was confident 
(in Brave New World Revisited) that his soma-laden world was closer to a real 
future than Orwell's 1984, and he was probably right but beside the point. 
1984 remains the stronger wake-up call and its central enigma, "Freedom is 
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Slavery," moves in elusive epicycles around the orbit of what we call "the 
free world." 
Two news stories dominated the year's events fifty years after Orwell's 
cautionary tale. In the Kosovo crisis, Oceania in the form of NATO bombed 
a small portion of Eurasia on behalf of an even smaller segment of Eastasia, if 
the Middle Eastern heritage of the Kosovo Albanians can bear that weight. At 
the same time, a series of school shootings, culminating in Littleton, Colo 
rado, challenged second-amendment fundamentalism. Considerable punditry 
and editorial handwringing saturated the American press over both of these 
topics. Each in a different way illustrates how freedom can become slavery to 
freedom, and how difficult it is to make knowledgeable choices. 
The school shootings present the easier case. While multiple and various 
factors contribute to the aggression and despair that leads children to vio 
lence, easy access to guns is a major and preventable efficient cause. The 
NRA and its minions sit belligerently on the second amendment to the con 
stitution, which says, in full, "a well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed." We forget history while constitutional lawyers debate what 
the second part means and survivalists enslave themselves behind barbed wire 
compounds in a misunderstanding of the first. There was a time in Anglo 
American culture when only nobility and landed gentry could bear arms, their 
heraldic signs legitimizing them and the soldiers they sponsored, and so a 
wider democracy extended that right in the interests of a more democratic 
militia. Even so, it takes a person with gunpowder for brains to think that "a 
well regulated Militia" requires a system that allows citizens to prey upon 
each other, or that it forbids intelligent regulations on selling and handling 
firearms. In 1999 Big Brother had Charleton Heston's face, assuring us that 
freedom is slavery to the gun lobby. 
If the gun control debate has paid too little attention to history, the crisis in 
Kosovo is dense with histories ancient and modern. No outside force can 
handle ancient tribal feuds, particularly when a brutal cynic like Slobodan 
Milosovec has control of a substantial war machine. He is a perfect Orwellian 
figure, by all accounts: a former communist functionary who used ethnic 
hatred to get and maintain power and whose first act when he felt threatened 
was to abolish a free press. If the fifteenth century created the Balkans and 
paved the way for a Milosovec, the twentieth century has turned them into a 
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jittery symbol of Europe's explosiveness. Memories of Archduke Ferdinand 
and then Nazi atrocities provoked NATO to intervene in what most Yugoslavs 
thought was an internal problem: conflict between Serbs and ethnic Albanians 
in the province of Kosovo. Memories of Vietnam made the United States 
reluctant to commit ground troops to the intervention. Instead, Yugoslavia 
endured eighty days of bombing, mostly military targets as far as we know, 
but also the occasional hospital, housing tract, and Kosovar refugee. The 
bombing also produced one of the century's best pieces of grim irony since 
Vietnam: the CIA misplaced a military target and got NATO bombs to 
pinpoint the Chinese embassy in Belgrade instead. So much for central intel 
ligence. 
At the same time Orwell was writing 1984, the new United Nations was 
drafting its "Universal Declaration of Human Bights." It passed despite hesi 
tations from the Soviet Union, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and several other 
states whose cultures varied from the Anglo-American traditions the docu 
ment embodied. According to the United Nations Yearbook for 1948-49, "The 
representative from Yugoslavia expressed the fear that, through lack of real 
substance, the Declaration might be forgotten even before the ink of the 
signatures affixed to the document had dried. For that reason, he urged the 
members of the Third Committee 'to exert every possible effort to draw up a 
text which would fulfil the legitimate aspirations of the people'" (529). The 
Kosovo crisis brings to mind Article 9 (among others): "No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile." I wonder how the Yugoslav 
representative would describe "the legitimate aspirations of the people" in the 
face of mass acts of "ethnic cleansing," in Kosovo? Yet it was not, finally, the 
United Nations who stepped in the Yugoslav mire, but NATO. 
Milosovec is a Hague-certified war criminal, his policy of ethnic cleansing 
just a step short of genocide. What was one to do? The truth is, there was no 
easy answer, and any course of action would be in some degree wrong. I once 
took a year-long course in international relations at UCLA from William 
Gerberding, who went on to lead the University of Washington for nearly 
three decades. I don't recall what examples were in front of us, but I will 
never forget Gerberding's conclusion: "some means justify some ends." 
Freedom's perfect dilemma is which means justify which ends. Knowledge is 
never 
complete. History leads and misleads. Assuming its best intentions, the 
NATO effort still suggests slavery to a manipulable idea of freedom, one that 
often enough confuses the right to live in peace with the right to build shop 
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ping malls. For the record, I have no idea whether fear of a larger European 
war or support for the ideals of the UN Delcaration of Human Rights justified 
bombing Yugoslavia. I do know that war is not peace and ignorance is not 
strength, and that conflicting lessons from history often signify difficult deci 
sions. 
Is freedom slavery? Not exactly, but neither is it the self-willed impulsive 
ness that teenagers most often call freedom, nor the super-individualistic dog 
matism of the anti-tax brigade, nor the militaristic imperialism that wraps 
itself in cultural self-righteousness. As John Milton and John Stuart Mill and 
George Orwell and Toni Morrison and the whole line of Anglo-American 
discourse on freedom emphasizes, freedom begins with attention to language. 
In his Appendix to 1984, "The Principles of Newspeak," Orwell explains that 
"it would have been quite impossible to render [the preface to the Declara 
tion of Independence] into Newspeak while keeping the sense of the original. 
The nearest one could come to doing so would be to swallow the whole 
passage up in the single word crimethink" (256). But forming that word would 
only force Winston Smith, and ourselves, to tease it apart again. 
Though Orwell did not write elegantly nor analyze character with any 
particular brilliance, his passion for meaningful language remains compelling. 
Long before the sometimes fanciful games of deconstruction, he pushed at 
tention to language, demanding that we notice disjunction and disorders be 
tween signifier and signified. His invitation to discover the missing connec 
tions within 
"freedomslavery" is nothing less than an invitation to make knowl 
edgeable choices, to accept our own agency, to exercise our freedom. 
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